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The post-independence technology trajectory for India had two broad objectives.  First, it 
aimed at building up strategic technological capability, and secondly, it strived to acquire 
industrial technological capability through learning and catch-up. Achievements on these 
fronts are quite often judged by contrasting the first with the second. If we analyse India’s 
technological progress in terms of its achievements on the strategic technology front in 
comparison with its technological effort towards industrial competitiveness and economic 
growth, we get somewhat mixed and conflicting signals about India’s technological 
accomplishments.  
The national level endeavour to build up strategic technological capability turned out to 
be successful on several counts. We get to see significant achievements in Space 
Research, Atomic Energy and Defence – evidently all under government patronage. 
Aryabhatta, India’s first satellite was launched way back in 1975 and an indigenously 
fabricated satellite launch vehicle was ready by 1980. India exploded its first 
underground nuclear device in 1974 and could set up nuclear power plants at Trombay 
and Kalapakkam. Later in 1985, the installation of a fast-breeder test reactor at 
Kalapakkam indeed marked a big step forward. These milestones, in a way, became the 
brightest examples that were cited quite often in support of a larger policy framework 
aimed at self-reliance adopted by India after independence. These milestones indeed 
deserve special mention because achievements of this order were somewhat unthinkable 
in the context of any other LDCs with similarly low levels of GDP per capita in those 
years. However, apart from these indicative achievements, it remains to be established 
how far India’s success in strategic technology can be compared with the existing global 
frontiers in these fields, generally benchmarked by the achievements of the West. But 
there is no denial that India’s achievements commanded a lot of awe and admiration from 
the entire world, especially given the fact that India was still a poor developing economy 
with very limited material capability. 
On the industrial front, the Soviet model of a planned economy for India, especially from 
the Second Five Year plan onwards, did aspire to mimic the development trajectories of 
the advanced industrialised nations. Accordingly, India adopted an inward looking 
development strategy and meticulously planned out a diversified industrial production 
base ranging from simple consumer items to sophisticated capital goods and heavy 
machinery. Therefore building up of indigenous technological capabilities as well as 
technological learning for catch-up became extremely important for its industrial and 
economic aspirations.  
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However, the flipside of the protectionist trade policy regime revealed itself in the form 
of inefficiencies of various kinds. India’s low but steady rate of growth during the initial 
years suffered a serious blow during the years of industrial deceleration, the saviour 
green revolution in agriculture notwithstanding. There was practically no incentive to 
keep pace with the fast changing global technology frontier in many of the manufacturing 
sectors, which resulted in Indian industry becoming technologically backward and 
inefficient with respect to global standards of costs and quality. Prolonged practice of 
inward-looking development policies discouraged competition and therefore killed the 
prospects for innovations and competitiveness at all levels of production. The public 
sector used technologies in a most cost-inefficient manner, while the private sector lacked 
both the initiative and the competence to advance technologies for greater efficiency in 
production and quality. Therefore perceived capabilities that the planners had in mind 
could not be transformed into actual competitive advantage. The Indian industry failed to 
keep pace with the fast moving frontiers of global technology and protectionist policy 
environment fostered such an incentive structure whereby there was no attempt to 
upgrade technologies or acquire new technologies from the global frontier. The form of 
technological capability building by the Indian industry during the first three decades 
post-independence remained by and large confined to routine activities of production and 
trouble shooting. 
Accordingly, India’s experience with technological progress has been varied and 
contrasting. During the first few decades of India’s development experience, the level of 
its industrial technology was in no way comparable with its achievements on the strategic 
technology front, however isolated and sporadic. Contrasts persisted even during the later 
decades of the nineties and beyond when India could actually showcase some of its 
technological capabilities in the high-tech sectors like Information Technology (IT) and 
subsequently was directly catering the world market, although its IT infrastructure back 
home remained seriously deficient.  
In this paper we focus only on India’s experience with innovations and technology 
generation for competitiveness and economic growth. However, India’s experiments with 
strategic technology demand a separate analysis and shall not be covered here. 
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC EMERGENCE 
The Productivity Story 
Economic theory, for long, highlighted capital and labour as the two primary factors of 
production and recognised them to be the key driving force behind production and 
growth. It was only in the 1950s that technological advancement as an important source 
of growth was brought into the discussion of mainstream economic theory. Solow’s 
(1957) pioneering attempt to estimate the contribution of physical factors to growth, by 
introducing the technique of growth accounting, revealed that only 1/8
th of the growth of 
the US economy during the first half of the last century could be explained by the growth 
of its endowments of physical factors, leaving the remaining to a “residual” (termed as 
technical progress or total factor productivity (TFP) growth). Such breakthrough 
revelation thereafter shifted the focus from physical factors to the role of technology in 
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economic progress. It is fairly well established now that technological advancement 
resulting from R&D is the most important factor behind today’s productivity growth in 
most industrialised countries across the globe. 
 
However, equating productivity growth with technological progress a la Solow (1957) 
can also be somewhat problematic in understanding the growth successes of developing 
nations. Not all productivity growth is derived “pure” technological advancement. 
Rather, a large part of productivity growth may arise out of improvements in labour force 
and human capital accumulation leading to high levels of cognitive skills of the labour 
force that permit better firm level adoption, adaptation and mastery of “given” 
technologies. In fact, Young (1995) makes an exemplary attempt to control for all 
changes in inputs, including improvement of the labour force as well as sustained capital 
accumulation, and found the residual TFP contribution to the growth of the East Asian 
Tigers between 1966 and 1990 to be abysmally low. It was 2.3 percent in Hong Kong, 2.1 
percent in Taiwan, 1.7 percent in South Korea and 0.2 percent in Singapore. Hence 
“technological improvement” in the neoclassical sense was perhaps not that important in 
facilitating the East Asian Miracle. 
 
TFP Calculations for the Indian Economy 
Against the backdrop of India’s technological effort, we explore its experience with total 
factor productivity growth (TFPG). There have been several attempts to measure TFPG 
in Indian industry in different time periods. Ahluwalia (1991) summarises the results 
pertaining to the period up to mid 1980s. Long term TFP growth in this period has been 
negligible in India. Later studies extended the period and came up with similar 
pessimistic conclusions. Balakrishnan and Puspangadan (1994), for instance, find TFPG 
to be 0.33 during 1970-71 to 1988-89. Unfortunately most of these estimates relate to 
TFPG at the aggregate industry.  
In a study undertaken for the Department of Science & Technology, Government of 
India, we attempted a more disaggregated analysis at the level of 29-industry 
classification.
1 Using a panel of 29 industries over 1975-76 to 1994-95, it estimated the 
following robust random effects model of Cobb-Douglas production function corrected 
for multicollinearity (using the ratio form) after confirming the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale. From the estimates we see an overall TFP growth of 0.024 (2.4%) during 
this period. However, the study also registers substantial variation of TFPG across 
industries and over time and sought to explain this variation in terms of R&D effort by 
estimating a panel model. R&D came up as a significant determinant of TFP growth. The 
time variable appears negative and significant over this entire period. This is indeed 
alarming. We find a distinct structural break in the growth of TFP in 1982. After a long 
period of decline and stagnation, productivity in Indian industry displayed an upward 
movement. This break coincided with a similar break identified by Ahluwalia (1991) in 
Cobb-Douglas production function estimation of the Indian industry.   
More importantly, wide variations in TFP growth experience of different industries in our 
29 classification structure, are also observed. Only 8 out of 29 industries recorded 
                                                 
1 Ray et. al. (1999), Ray and Bhaduri (2002) 
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positive TFP growth. Among these, E&E  (Electrical and Electronics)  achieved a 
phenomenal 137% growth in TFP during this period. TFP growth in fertiliser and telecom 
sectors were 73% and 50% respectively. Sugar and fermentation industries displayed 
moderate TFPG of around 30%. It may be worth noting that almost all sectors 
constituting the chemical industry experienced negative TFPG with the exception of 
fertilisers. Interestingly, in the three sectors registering highest TFPG (E&E, fertilisers 
and telecom), public sector’s contribution in total R&D expenditure is fairly high (43%, 
82% and 69% respectively). 
These calculations show that technological progress (a la Solow) did not contribute 
significantly to India’s industrial growth. However, this does not mean that technology 
had no role in India’s development experience. It is this context that we attempt to 
technological progress taking it beyond neo-classical perspectives. 
 
Beyond Neo-Classical Perspectives 
 
Neoclassical theory identifies technological progress with major breakthroughs in science 
and technology resulting in a shift of the frontier.
2 The important contribution to 
technical progress made in diffusion, adaptation and application of new technologies, 
which are particularly important in the context of LDCs, has therefore remained under-
emphasized in the neoclassical tradition. The stages of technological capability 
acquisition can be described as a process of path dependent evolution.
3 It begins with 
learning by doing followed by learning by adapting, aiming at augmenting productivity 
through efficient utilisation and adaptation of technologies at the shop floor. We call this 
the stage of production engineering. Next comes learning by design and learning by 
improved design, aiming at replicating processes and designs for better understanding and 
further improvement of given technologies. This stage is described as reverse 
engineering. All this culminates into learning by setting up complete production systems 
and  learning by designing new processes which ultimately sets the stage for basic 
(frontier) R&D capabilities. 
Following Lall (1985), it is useful to categorise technological capability as “know-how” 
and “know-why”. Know-how is acquired through “not only the assimilation of imported 
techniques (which itself can be a lengthy and active learning process) but also quality 
control (which also involves active technical effort), improved plant layout and 
production practices, slight modifications to equipment and tooling, troubleshooting, the 
use of different raw materials and so on”,
4 all of which can be summarised as production 
engineering. Know-why is the next stage of technological development, which involves 
the understanding of the nature of the process and product technologies leading to the 
                                                 
2 See, for instance Schumpeter (1934, 1939). Note that Rosenberg (1976) has strongly criticized the 
Schumpeterian usage of the term “innovation” on four grounds: “(1) We confine our thinking about 
innovations to characteristics which are likely to be true only of major innovations, (2) we focus 
disproportionately upon discontinuities and neglect continuities in the innovative process, (3) we attach 
excessive importance to the role of scientific knowledge and insufficient importance to engineering and 
other ‘lower’ forms of knowledge, and (4) we attach excessive significance to early stages in the process of 
invention and neglect the crucial later stages”. 
3 Lall (1978) 
4 Lall (1985), page 116. 
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development of new improved designs. Applied research and frontier R&D leading to 
major innovations follow this stage.
  
Following such notions that takes us beyond neo-classical conceptualisation to 
appropriately understand the process of technological capability acquisition of the LDCs, 
it can broadly be summarised that know-how is expected to bring about rapid and 
immediate productivity growth in LDCs. Know-why, on the other hand, is absolutely 
necessary (but by no means sufficient) to create and strengthen the technological 
foundation of LDCs. By-passing this phase of know-why oriented technological learning, 
LDCs can never possibly aspire to reach the global frontiers of technology to catch up 
with the levels of technological advancement of developed countries in the long run. 
However, there may not be any immediate pay-off of know-why oriented technological 
effort in terms of immediate productivity gains in the short and medium terms. 
What then are the technological options available to LDCs? In very broad and simple 
terms, there are two alternatives, not necessarily mutually exclusive:  
1.  Bring in latest imported technology (exploit the global frontier) and focus on 
know-how to reap maximum productivity gains. 
2.  Concentrate on know-why and applied research to create capabilities to generate 
new technology and attempt to catch up with the advanced nations on their own 
footing.  
 
Historically, LDCs have usually opted for different combinations of the above two, 
depending on their initial conditions and policy focus. Accordingly we may find inter-
country variations in the levels of technological capability acquired by LDCs. Evenson 
and Johnson (1998) have classified developing countries into six levels of technological 
capability. Countries belonging to the lowest three levels of technological capability 
generally do not undertake any R&D work. Though a little bit of R&D work is visible in 
the third level, it is mostly directed towards pirating of trade marks and design. In these 
three levels production technology is essentially purchased in an “inter-linked” 
contractual form. In the fourth and fifth levels of technological capability, the dominant 
objective of firm level R&D is to facilitate technology purchase, directly (licensing) or 
indirectly. Here the role of R&D is to create absorptive capacity to understand and adapt 
and implement the purchased technology successfully. Some adaptive invention is 
undertaken, usually stimulated by domestic intellectual property rights. The technological 
competence developed through R&D in these countries is instrumental in initiating 
activities of reverse engineering or imitation. In the sixth level of technological 
infrastructure, imitation is generally taken up as a conscious policy of technology 
generation through a more structured “buy-then-imitate” strategy. According to this 
classification by Evenson and Johnson (1998), India falls into the fifth level of 
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INDIA’S TRYST WITH TECHNOLOGY: ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
While strategic technology remained exclusively with the government to be developed 
and used, the government did also play a proactive role in the domain of industrial 
technology. It is in this context that one finds it extremely important to understand the 
role of the Indian government in defining national strategies for technology generation, in 
terms of its objectives, magnitude and channels in areas other than strategic technology.  
 
India’s Technology Policy: A Brief Overview 
The basic objective of India’s post independence technology policy was “the 
development of indigenous technology and efficient absorption and adaptation of 
imported technology appropriate to national priorities and resources.”
5 Attainment of 
technological competence and self reliance was placed at the heart of India’s 
technological development. The aim was to achieve breakthroughs in indigenous 
technological development “appropriate to national priorities and resources” (i.e., 
maximum utilisation of human resources, efficient use of energy, increasing productivity, 
maintenance of ecological balance).  
In fact, prior to 1990, the Indian economy operated within the broad framework of an 
inward looking policy regime of protection and interventions. Restrictions and 
regulations on trade and industrial production were pervasive. Against this backdrop of 
the overall policy framework, the main focus of India’s technology policy was not only to 
build up search-,  selection-,  implementation- and absorptive- capability, but also to 
acquire technological capabilities of adaptation and minor innovation through reverse 
engineering.  
Apart from the direct policies to promote indigenous technology development, the 
Government had also adopted indirect policies for restricting and regulating technology 
imports and technology transfer. Till 1991, import substitution and technological self-
reliance constituted the core of India’s technology policy, which was in line with its 
inward looking overall policy regime. Import of technologies in the form of licensing as 
well as foreign direct investment (FDI) was severely restricted in order to promote 
indigenous technology. The importer of technology had to obtain a clearance from 
appropriate government authorities after a thorough screening to make sure that there are 
no objections on grounds of high cost, “inappropriateness”, availability of local 
substitutes or even the long term building up of indigenous R&D capability. The onus lay 
on the prospective importer to show that the technology was necessary (in terms of plan 
priorities), not available locally and fairly priced (Lall 1984).  
As far as in-house industrial R&D is concerned, the import substituting policy regime 
typically fostered several conditions – no direct need to keep up with the global frontiers 
of technology, small size of operations, various input scarcities, and lack of adequate 
competitive pressures with respect to cost and quality – all of which dampened the effort 
to build up sustained technological capability at the frontiers. The absence of competition 
in any of the three key dimensions (domestic or internal competition, import competition, 
                                                 
5 Technology Policy Statement of 1983, Govt of India (1983), page 3. 
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export rivalry) encouraged conservative technological behaviour on the part of the Indian 
firms preventing technological upgrading, let alone major innovations and breakthroughs. 
Moreover, restrictions on technology imports resulted in failure to promote effective 
transfer and absorption (know-how) of latest global technologies. Although, many Indian 
firms did manage to assimilate a lot of basic technology and even improved upon it, they 
remained far behind the global frontiers of technology.  
India’s technology policies have included both direct policies for indigenous 
technological development as well as indirect policies for restricting and regulating 
technology imports and technology transfer. The decade of 1990s started with the 
ongoing thrust of integrating the Indian economy with the global economy in the GATT-
WTO framework. From 1991, with the liberalisation of the Indian economy, restrictions 
on imports, FDI and technology transfer have been progressively removed. The 
technology policy also had to be moderated, and attuned to meet the new challenges of 
global competition. In fact, the Science and Technology Policy 2003 states that, “It is 
recognised that these objectives (of S&T policy 2003) will be best realised by a dynamic 
and flexible Science and Technology Policy, which can readily adapt to the rapidly 
changing world order. This policy, reiterates India’s commitment to participate as an 
equal and vigorous global player….” The first Scientific Policy Resolution was published 
as early as 1958 and the latest Technology Policy Statement appeared in 2003. Over this 
half a century, there has been a major shift in India’s policy stance towards technology 
development, roughly coinciding with India’s economic reforms and trade liberalisation 
in the 1990s. Accordingly, India’s technology policy environment has been distinctly 
different in the pre and post-reforms period.  
 
Channels of Technology Generation in India 
 
We can primarily identify four channels through which the government intended to 
advance the cause of technology generation (R&D) in India: (1) investing in applied 
industrial research, (2) promoting science education and fundamental academic research, 
(3) public-sector production and (4) offering fiscal and non-fiscal R&D incentives to the 
private sector. 
Applied Industrial Research 
If we look at the R&D expenditure incurred in India before 1990s we find that the share 
of national R&D expenditure in gross national product (GNP) had increased steadily 
from 0.17% in 1958-59 to 0.98% in 1987-88, the major share of which was borne by the 
Government.
6 The overwhelming majority of government R&D expenditure was 
allocated to various public sector research laboratories, under the auspices of the CSIR 
(Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) engaged in applied research in a wide 
range of fields including areas like aeronautics, experimental medicine, environment, 
oceanography and structural engineering.   
Public sector (institutional R&D) played the dominant role, especially during the pre-
reforms period (pre-1990). In this phase, much of the technological effort went into 
                                                 
6 Even as late as 1998-99, 75.5% of the national R&D expenditure in India was borne by the Government. 
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creating technologies first time in the country rather than breakthroughs first time in the 
world and that too pre-dominantly in the public sector institutions.
7 This is perhaps 
expected as it conformed to the broad objective of creating technological self reliance in 
the pre-reform period. However, it is doubtful whether these efforts of the public research 
laboratories have had “much impact on technological development in large scale 
organised industry, though it claims to have provided hundreds of technologies for use to 
small scale enterprises”.
8 More importantly, it is doubtful how efficient these 
indigenously developed “new” technologies were, by international standards of costs and 
quality.  
 
Science Education and Fundamental Research 
The grand vision of building up indigenous capabilities in India was thought could be 
achieved not only by imparting science education to the coming generations to constitute 
a large pool of highly skilled workforce but by also improving the conditions for 
fundamental research in the country. The higher education policy post-independence 
envisaged setting up of several Indian Institutes of Technology, Regional Engineering 
Colleges and Central Universities across the country. The IITs went a long way in 
providing the country with highly-skilled technical manpower over the next decades, so 
much so that India’s relatively recent transition to a global economic power based on 
some of the high-tech sectors like the IT is often attributed to the indirect role of these 
institutions. 
However, it remains debatable whether the above mentioned publicly funded institutions 
were equally focussed on fundamental research. It is agreed that these establishments 
were mandated to conduct fundamental research, but for long these institutions failed to 
live up to such research aspirations. Although the newly modelled ‘technology’ education 
institutes along with the traditional university system did succeed enormously in their 
endeavour to generate high skilled human resources, they lacked appropriate initiative to 
take forward fundamental or cutting-edge research. 
Public Sector Production 
As mentioned in the introduction, public-sector production inspired by the Soviet model 
of a planned economy was seriously considered in India post-independence, especially 
from the Second Five Year plan onwards. The Indian government perhaps aspired to 
mimic the development trajectories of the advanced industrialised nations. Accordingly, 
inward looking development strategy and a meticulously planned out  diversified 
industrial production base ranging from simple consumer items to sophisticated capital 
goods and heavy machinery was adopted in India. This implied heavy investments on 
import substituting industries across the board on the part of the government. Indeed, it is 
through such a process that building up of indigenous technological capabilities as well 
as technological learning for catch-up became extremely important for India’s industrial 
and economic aspirations.  
                                                 
7 In very few cases in which “pioneering” technologies were created were those using typically Indianised 
raw materials, e.g. Amul Spray – a baby food technology from buffalo milk.  
8 Lall (1984), page 233. 
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However, through direct intervention in industrial production on the basis of a priori 
planning, the government seemed to ignore the notion of natural comparative advantage. 
The protectionist trade policy regime practically left no incentive to keep pace with the 
fast changing global technology frontier in many of the manufacturing sectors most of 
them in the public sector, which resulted in Indian industry becoming technologically 
backward and inefficient with respect to global standards of costs and quality.  
R&D incentives to the private sector 
The above three channels clearly indicate that India’s technology policy in the pre 
reforms era was essentially grounded on building up of national level capabilities through 
the public institutions. But, at the same time, industry (private and public sector) was 
encouraged to actively engage in R&D activities to develop absorptive and adaptive 
capabilities. To this end, the government also offered specific R&D incentives with the 
objective of building up domestic technological capability for rapid industrialisation 
going beyond spending directly on R&D. Prior to the 1990s, the main thrust of the R&D 
incentives was to generate indigenous technologies primarily in the institutional sector 
(public funded R&D institutions) and facilitate effective commercialisation, transfer and 
absorption of such technologies in the industrial sector. There were very few incentives at 
the firm level with the explicit aim of augmenting technology-creating capabilities. In-
house R&D was encouraged only to facilitate acquisition of technological capabilities of 
absorption, adaptation and assimilation. Special incentives were given to firms using 
indigenous technologies developed by R&D institutions.  
The decade of the 1990s saw a departure in the sense that government attempted to 
distinguish between fundamental R&D and commercial R&D, both in the private R&D 
units. One contrasting feature is the shift of focus of fiscal incentives from national R&D 
institutions to R&D carried out by the industry either in in-house R&D units or in the 
SIROs (Scientific and Industrial Research Organization). Indeed, post 1991, the thrust of 
R&D incentives showed a clear shift away from the institutional sector to technology 
generation by the industrial sector.  
 
R&D Expenditure and R&D Outcomes in India: Macro Trends 
 
Against the backdrop of a well articulated technology policy over the last half a century, 
India’s share of national R&D expenditure in gross national product (GNP) had increased 
steadily from 0.17% in 1958-59 to 0.91% in 1988-89. Thereafter it started declining 
reaching a low of 0.71% in 1995-96 and finally it has settled around 0.8% as per the 
latest available information.
9 This is rather alarming, especially in the context of the new 
economic policy regime of reforms and globalisation. In spite of a clear mandate of the 
Science and Technology Policy of 2003 to strengthen India’s in-house industrial R&D in 
the post “liberalisation” period by raising the above share to at least 2% of India’s GNP 
by the end of the Tenth Plan, India has not even been able to reach the 1% target. It is 
worth noting that among the newly industrialised Asian countries, South Korea spends as 
                                                 
9 R&D Statistics, Dept of Science & Technology, Government of India. 
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much as 2.8% of its GNP on R&D, which is at par with industrialised nations, like US, 
Japan, UK and Germany.  
The Government’s R&D expenditure takes two forms: institutional R&D in Central and 
State Government laboratories and industrial in-house R&D in public sector enterprises, 
accounting for 62.6%, 8.5% and 4.5% of total (national) R&D expenditure respectively. 
There is small portion (4.1%) going to higher education, bringing the total share of the 
government in India’s R&D expenditure to 79.7%. The share of private sector R&D 
remains around 20%. Industrial R&D (public + private sector) constitute only 24.8% of 
total R&D.
10 This share is remarkably low compared to some of the East Asian countries, 
e.g. Singapore (60% in 1992), Korea (around 80% in 1992) and Taiwan (50% in 1993). 
A comparison of aggregate nominal R&D expenditure also reveals some interesting 
turnarounds. While every sector has witnessed a growth in the nominal R&D expenditure 
their growth rates are far from being uniform. Moreover, there is also evidence of 
contrasting growth rate of a particular sector during the 1980s and 1990s. Overall during 
the entire period, the growth rate of the private sector R&D expenditure has been the 
highest followed by the growth of the state sector, central sector and public sector. 
However, during the 1980s, the state sector witnessed the highest rate of increase in R&D 
expenditure followed by private sector, public sector and central institutes. The decade of 
1990s saw a reversal in this trend. Private sector emerges as the fastest growing sector, 
followed by the central R&D institutes. The rate of increase of public sector R&D 
expenditure fell from 0.75 in the 1980s to 0.57 in the 1990s. This picture seems to be 
compatible with the overall decline in the policy attention towards public sector 
enterprises. On the other hand, co-operative R&D between the private sector and central 
R&D institutes seems to have taken-off resulting in high growth rates of R&D 
expenditure in both the sectors. State sector growth rate also increased marginally. 
However, it appears that central R&D institutes has performed better than the state 
institutes in the decade of 1990s, may be due to better inflow of sponsored research 
received by some of them, which has been a key feature of the R&D incentive structure 
in the 1990s. 
India’s post-independence inward looking policy regime did manage to generate a 
considerable amount of technological effort and development. To understand India’s 
trajectory of technological learning and technological capability acquisition, let us take a 
quick look at the technological achievements in terms of R&D output. 
Fiscal incentives for R&D took a new turn in the era of globalisation with the focus 
shifting from institutional to industrial R&D. Ray (2004) takes a closer look at the profile 
and composition of R&D expenditure and outputs in terms of institutional versus 
industrial R&D over the period 1986-2000 and attempts to relate this with the structural 
changes in incentives. The Department of Science and Technology (DST), Government 
of India identifies various technological outputs and publishes it in their biennial R&D 
Statistics volumes. The study on the basis of the mentioned database have categorized 
                                                 
10 See R&D Statistics 2004-05, Department of Science &Technology, Government of India. 
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these outputs in two groups: Type-1 output includes R&D outcomes like patents, product 
development, process development, development of new designs and import substitutes, 
which directly augment firm-level productivity and profitability. Type-2 output consists 
of R&D outputs like consultancy services rendered and publication of books, papers and 
reports, which reflect technological capability through augmenting knowledge-base, but 
do not directly enter the firm’s production function, at least, in the short run.  
It is quite understandable that the institutional sector puts more emphasis on type-2 
output while industry puts more emphasis on type-1 output. The industry is more 
concerned with type-1 output for immediate gains in profitability and productivity. But 
the institutional sector during the 1980s perhaps followed a social mandate of enriching 
the public domain of R&D knowledge by producing and disseminating type-2 output. 
The situation has somewhat changed in the last decade. The study finds that industry’s 
share of type-2 output in total R&D output is increasing. This increase can be attributed 
to the changes in the R&D incentive structure, which does not intend to portray the public 
sector R&D institutes as the sole source of indigenous technologies and knowledge-base. 
Industry, in the changed scenario, has to appreciate the complementarities between the 
two types of R&D outputs – instant productivity gains through type-1 and augmenting 
knowledge base through type-2. 
One interesting finding relates to the relative importance of import substitutes developed 
by the institutional and industrial sectors. The share of import substitutes in Type-1 
output produced by the institutional sector declined from around 0.81 in the 1980s to 
around 0.3-0.4 in the 1990s. The industry, however, has maintained its share of import 
substitutes (perhaps a marginal increase) in Type-1 output at 0.2. Note that the decade of 
1980s had a clear mandate to develop import substitutes in both sectors which has been 
removed in the 1990s. We, however, conclude that the scope of cost effective import 
substitution by industry, especially in a profit maximizing framework, continues even 
with globalization and economic reforms. 
IPR Policy and Technological Learning in India 
The debate on optimum IPR policy continues, one is tempted to conclude that a weak IPR 
policy would perhaps be preferred over a stronger one in the initial stages of 
technological learning and economic development. But, once a country reaches 
technology maturity to achieve major breakthroughs, the benefits of protecting 
knowledge through strong IPR (incentive to innovate) might outweigh the benefits of 
diffusion. Hence, a strong IPR policy that encourages innovation may be necessary at a 
later stage after the country in question acquires innovative capability through learning.  
This essentially reflects that IPR policy can not remain static or invariant over time. It 
needs to be modified, fine-tuned and adjusted at various points in the technological 
learning trajectory of a nation, according to the nature and level of technological 
capability already acquired through this learning process. At the same time the nature and 
extent of technological learning will also definitely be shaped by the IPR policy adopted. 
In other words, technological learning and IPR policy have a strong mutual interface in 
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the way they evolve. Technological learning begins with know-how oriented production 
engineering followed by know-why oriented reverse engineering (RE) under weak IPR till 
sufficient innovative capability is acquired for basic research. At this point IPR regime is 
made stronger to enable firms to adopt basic research as a viable (and sustainable) 
strategic option. Without the introduction of a strong IPR as a negotiated order at this 
juncture, the transition to basic research will perhaps prove to be difficult and 
unsustainable. 
11
The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Regime adopted by India has acted as an indirect 
policy for the Indian industry. The Patent Act of 1970 did promote considerable 
technological learning and acquisition of technological capability through reverse 
engineering activities. However, the technological trajectory of sectors like the E&E was 
essentially targeted towards achievement of high TFP (based on know-how capabilities) 
with little emphasis on acquisition of adaptive and designing (know-why) capabilities and 
therefore, IPR policy had perhaps little role to play in this regard. The pharmaceutical 
industry, on the other hand, focused on building up of know-why oriented technological 
capability, even at the cost of immediate productivity gains in the short or medium terms. 
Here the IPR regimes did matter. Indeed, the process  revolution in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry reflecting significant learning and technological catch up can be 
largely attributed to the Patent Act of 1970 allowing only process (and not product) 
patents for pharmaceutical substances. One may, of course, further argue that India’s 
transition in 2005 into a stronger IPR regime, compatible with the TRIPS agreement, is 
perhaps the right moment to leverage its innovative capacity to take a leap towards basic 
research (new drug discovery).  
 
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
ACQUISITION BY THE INDIAN INDUSTRY 
 
The econometric results obtained by Ray and Bhaduri (2001) presented new and 
interesting insights into the process of technology generation and learning in the Indian 
pharmaceutical and electronics sectors. They made a clear distinction between R&D 
inputs and R&D outputs in a research production function framework to understand the 
process of technology generation. We found that the conventional determinants of R&D, 
like firm-size, technology import or ownership, appear significant only in explaining 
R&D effort in line with existing empirical studies. However, when sought to explain the 
variations in research output, none of these factors, not even research effort on its own, 
appears to be statistically significant. Here in fact, learning, both experience-based as 
well as interaction (or spillover) based, proved to be the only important determinant of 
the research production process. According to Ray and Bhaduri (2001), therefore, 
technological learning has been the most important determinant of technology generation 
in Indian industry. 
 
                                                 
11 However, a pre-mature imposition of strong IPR, suppressing the evolutionary interface between TC and 
IPR, will not merely put a halt to the technological catch up process but will actually revert the learning 
trajectory back to the stage of production engineering. See Ray and Bhaduri (2008). 
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First of all, learning through interaction (spillover) proved to be important in the research 
production process for both sectors. The effect of spillover on research output appeared to 
be non-linear. In both industries there was evidence of an optimum level of spillover 
(national as well as international). Learning through experience also entered the research 
production function for both sectors, although the way in which it augments research 
output differs across the two industries. 
 
Indeed, the two sectors have followed two distinct trajectories of technological learning, 
resulting in different kinds of technological capability generation. In the electronics 
industry in India (characterized primarily by “screw-driver” technology), assembly 
operations, production engineering, shop-floor practices and quality control could prove 
to be the key elements of technological effort. In-depth technological learning of product 
designs and processes have perhaps been less important for electronics firms in India. 
Their technological effort lay primarily in gaining operational efficiency and productivity 
augmentation through shop-floor practices, day-to-day trouble shooting and customer 
servicing. Hence, it is know-how rather than know-why that best describes the learning 
trajectory of electronics industry in India. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry in India, on the other hand, followed a rather different 
trajectory of technological learning based on reverse engineering.
12 This essentially 
implies decoding an original process for producing a bulk drug. This involves a detailed 
understanding of the chemical properties of the active molecule, the excipients used and 
the chemical process of conversion from the active molecular compound to the final bulk 
drug. A chemical process incorporates a complex set of parameters, e.g., solvent 
conditions, temperature, time, stirring methods, use of various chemical and physical 
substances with different levels of purity etc., all of which have to be simultaneously 
optimised in order to arrive at the optimum process specification. It is possible to decode 
all of these parametric specifications of a process through reverse engineering.  
 
Indeed, from the decade of the 1970s, the industry acquired substantial technological 
capability of process development through reverse engineering, both infringing processes 
for off-patented molecules and non-infringing processes for patented molecules. This 
phenomenon has been often been referred to as the process revolution in the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector.  
 
Effectively then, the learning process has been largely know-why oriented in the 
pharmaceutical sector, while in electronics, it has perhaps been simpler and more know 
how oriented. We may expect a significant role of formal R&D in the learning process of 
the former. Learning in electronics, on the other hand, is likely to be less dependent on 
formal R&D.




                                                 
12 Ray (2005) 
13 The results of estimated production functions with R&D as third input for the two sectors reported above 
vindicate this hypothesis.  
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Implications for Export Competitiveness 
 
To explain India’s technological advantages in exporting, we again refer to the distinction 
between know-how and know-why capabilities. Know-how is acquired through “not only 
the assimilation of imported techniques (which itself can be a lengthy and active learning 
process) but also quality control (which also involves active technical effort), improved 
plant layout and production practices, slight modifications to equipment and tooling, 
troubleshooting, the use of different raw materials and so on”,
14 all of which can be 
summarised as production engineering. Hence know-how oriented technological effort 
leads to greater production efficiency and therefore reduced marginal costs. Know-why is 
the next stage of technological development, which involves the understanding of the 
nature of the process and product technologies, ultimately, leading to the development of 
new improved processes and designs. Clearly, reduction of marginal cost may not be the 
overriding, or even an important consideration for such know-why oriented technological 
activities, at least initially.  
However, technology creating know-why capabilities (reverse engineering) may actually 
reduce export competitiveness since reverse engineered processes and designs do not 
usually lead to greater production- and cost-efficiency, at least in the short run. Sustained 
effort towards know-why activities may eventually lead to technology creating 
capabilities to invent around cost-effective processes or designs.
15 This could then act as 
a major fillip to the LDC firms’ competitive edge in the long run and prove to be a key 
determinant of their export success.  Indeed, international competitive strength of Japan’s 
automobile industry and Korean semi-conductor industry was hidden in its capability to 
invent around, which evolved out of conscious long-term research effort on creating 
know-why capabilities.  
Econometric results in Bhaduri and Ray (2004), capturing the impact of these various 
facets of technological capability on export performance, revealed striking inter-industry 
differences found that know-how (or production engineering) augments export 
performance in both sectors but know-why (or reverse engineering) was important for 
pharmaceutical exports, not E&E. Indeed, as argued earlier, it is know-how oriented 
capabilities (production engineering, quality control for instance) that augments 
production efficiency and enables an LDC firm to remain internationally competitive. 
Know-why capabilities, on the other hand, raises export competitiveness only in the long 
run after a gestation lag of successful learning.  
One may of course ask why the E&E firms in India, unlike pharmaceuticals, are unable to 
augment exports through know-why capabilities. The reason perhaps lies in the different 
characters of the two products. While in both cases the global technological frontier is 
moving fast, in E&E the rate of product obsolescence is very high, whereas an old drug is 
never quite pushed out of the market even in the long run when a new “better” 
replacement arrives. Therefore there is ample scope and incentive to carry out sustained 
know-why activities of inventing around cost efficient processes and designs keeping in 
                                                 
14 Lall (1985), page 116. 
15 Dore (1984). 
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mind the off-patent segment of the international pharmaceutical market. Such long run 
prospects of pay-off from know-why do not exist in case of E&E characterized by high 
rate of product obsolescence. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE WAY FORWARD 
To conclude our paper, we note that India missed the opportunity to join the other labour 
surplus Asian economies in the so-called Asian miracle of the 1970s and 1980s that was 
essentially a growth process spearheaded by massive expansion of labour intensive 
manufactured exports. Despite India’s vast pool of labour resources, India was left 
behind, when the rest of labour surplus Asia was getting integrated with the world 
economy based on low labour cost advantages. Fortunately, however, the advantage 
conferred by low labour costs in India has been pervasive, extending well beyond the 
realm of traditional labour-intensive goods into new industries and services, like software 
and IT, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and long-distance communication-based services, 
where skills and technological capability play a vital role in shaping competitive 
advantage. India’s strength in quite a few industries within the manufacturing sector 
which requires process, product and capital engineering skills is now well demonstrated. 
 
If we look at the Indian manufacturing experience we find that India has several 
advantages in skill-intensive industries, such as auto-components, pharmaceuticals, 
forgings (both for automotive and non-automotive sectors), power and transport 
machinery, high-end electrical and electronics and specialty chemicals. Apart from the 
abundance of skills, these advantages include technological capability (process, product 
and capital engineering) plus established raw material bases, a mature supply base and a 
growing domestic demand. This has lead to India being considered as a design house, a 
tooling centre, a components base, and a manufacturing hub by many MNEs. Indeed, 
from the experience of India’s economic progress in the last decade or so, it is quite 
evident that knowledge intensive sectors have been driving India’s growth, be it IT, 
Biotech or Pharmaceuticals among many more skill intensive service sectors.  
 
However, India’s technological advantages in these skill intensive areas have still by and 
large remained confined to the domain of minor as opposed to major innovative 
capabilities. India has demonstrated significant competitive strength in routine (through 
skill intensive) tasks like coding (in software) or process development (in 
pharmaceuticals), and perhaps less so in creativity and innovativeness. At this critical 
juncture when India is imminently poised for a successful transition to a knowledge 
economy, it becomes all the more important to revitalise India’s technological capability 
building through the most appropriate coupling of creative pursuits (especially through 
public funded research) with applications for industrial R&D. It is in this context, we 
need to take a fresh look at the role of universities and other institutions of higher 
learning.  
 
While India’s advantage in high end human capital may be primarily attributed to its 
persistent policy thrust on higher education (especially technical and scientific) creating 
an extensive network of universities and institutions of higher learning (IITs and IIMs), 
the Indian university system has failed to contribute adequately to the process of 
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technological learning and catch up. Even though the universities and institutions have 
been quite active in their research pursuits, university-industry interface in this regard has 
remained sub-optimum (Ray 2003). It has often been felt that India’s transition to a 
knowledge driven economy would be much easier if the “rich” research potential of its 
huge pool of premier universities and institutions could be harnessed for effective 
commercial application and industrial development.  
Having said so, we suggest that while carving out an appropriate (optimum) technology 
strategy for India, one can not afford to ignore other sectors of the economy, especially 
the labour intensive mass manufacturing where productivity augmentation through know-
how capabilities may prove to be crucially important for sustained TFP growth and 
industrial development. While India has nurtured and succeeded (to a large extent) with 
high-end human capital for technological capability in the skill intensive sectors, it has 
been accompanied with a tragic neglect of low end human capital investment (in primary 
education and health) for productivity gains in mass manufacturing sectors.
16 By 
stimulating broad based expansion of these sectors through low end human capital and 
technological capability building, India could bring on board its 300 million poor who 
have been completely left out of India’s prosperity through its emergence as a major 
economic player in the world economy. Such an “inclusive” technology strategy would 
be of critical importance for the sustainability of India’s growth process.  
 
                                                 
16 Guha and Ray (2004), Ray (2006). 
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